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Abstract 
Recent studies have shown that different free will beliefs affect moral behavior. The purpose of 
the current study was to investigate whether different free will beliefs also influence moral 
judgment. College students (N = 56) were randomly assigned to one of three framing 
manipulations: free will, determinism, or neutral. They then read three morally questionable 
scenarios that differed by situational context. Following each scenario, participants completed a 
moral judgment questionnaire that measured four moral constructs: moral evaluation, moral 
responsibility, justification, and punishment. Finally, participants completed a Free Will & 
Determinism Questionnaire (FWD-Q) that measured their lay beliefs in free will and 
determinism. For analysis, we grouped participants according to their reported FWD-Q scores 
into one of three groups: free will, determinism, or compatibilism. We found that different free 
will beliefs influenced moral judgment to a small degree, but not in the ways that we predicted. 
Our results show that situational context affects moral judgment much more than lay 
philosophical beliefs regarding free will. Future studies should examine whether this still holds 
true for older adults with more developed worldviews. 
 
MULTIFACED NATURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                                                4 
 
Situational Context, Philosophical Belief, and Moral Constructs: The Multifaceted Nature of 
Moral Judgment 
Overview 
Evaluating the behaviors of others is a crucial aspect of human nature that is conducive to 
an orderly society. For example, one of the ways we are able to effectively operate as a society is 
by praising “right” behaviors and punishing “wrong” behaviors. This can take place formally, 
such as a courtroom case, or informally, such as a child being chastised by her parents for unfair 
behavior. “Right” behaviors refer to actions that one’s society deems permissible and that stem 
from good intentions, whereas “wrong” behaviors are deemed impermissible by one’s society 
and often stem from malicious intent.  The kinds of deportment individuals within a society take 
to be moral or immoral play a key role in determining whether certain behaviors in question will 
ultimately be assessed as permissible or impermissible. 
Morality, the differentiation between behavior that is “fair” or “unfair,” “good” or “bad,” 
is a long standing topic of interest in psychological research. It is an ambiguous topic due to its 
abstract and inexact nature. Thus, the morality of many behaviors are open to interpretation and 
debate (e.g., whether it is moral to kill one person to save two lives). Given the imprecise nature 
of morality, psychologists who study morality are particularly interested in factors that influence 
individuals’ judgments in different situations that require an ethical assessment. In the literature, 
the term “moral judgment” refers to these types of ethical assessments. More specifically, moral 
judgment refers to an individual’s evaluation and perception of whether a certain behavior in 
question is right or wrong.  
In the field of psychology, moral judgment is usually studied by presenting participants 
with a scenario(s) involving some sort of moral violation, moral transgression, or moral dilemma. 
MULTIFACED NATURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                                                5 
 
Moral judgment is usually measured by way of surveys that contain questions such as “How 
wrong was X’s behavior?” or “How morally responsible was X?” (Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 
2013). Researchers often shape their questions to measure evaluations of moral responsibility 
and assignments of punishment (Kane et al., 1977; Green et al., 2001; Woolfolk et al., 2006). 
This is because in the real world, moral transgressions are often followed by some sort of 
punishment, and punishment is generally allocated on the assumption that the transgressor was 
morally responsible for her transgression. Otherwise, punishing someone for a crime they aren’t 
morally responsible for just doesn’t make sense.   
A number of studies have linked perceived decision freedom to attributions of moral 
responsibility and assignments of punishment (Kane et al., 1977; Woolfolk, et al., 2006). In these 
studies, perceived freedom was conceptualized as the ability to fulfill a desired choice on one’s 
own accord without the interference of external restrictions, such as situational constraints and 
coercion from other parties. This is closely related to the philosophical concept of free will, 
which we conceptualize in this study as the capacity to behave and make choices that are not 
necessarily determined by antecedent events and external factors such as laws of nature.  
If researchers have uncovered a relationship between perceived decision freedom and 
attributions of moral responsibility and assignments of punishment, and if moral responsibility 
and punishment play important roles in moral judgment, then it seems that different free will 
beliefs may be a significant factor in influencing moral judgment. This is the question we aim to 
investigate in the present study. 
Background  
Moral judgment factors. Among many other factors, anger and disgust (Ugazio, Lamm, 
& Singer, 2012), as well as affective context (Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006), and even thoughts 
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about science (Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 2013) have been shown to significantly affect the way 
individuals morally judge the behaviors of others. Anger and disgust as emotional primes have 
been specifically identified to have significant effects on individuals’ moral judgments (Ugazio, 
Lamm, & Singer, 2012); interestingly, these researchers also found that other emotional primes, 
such as happiness and sadness, did not yield any significant effects on their subjects’ moral 
judgments. Ugazio, Lamm, and Singer (2010) induced disgust in their participants via “fart 
sprays.” They induced anger by instructing their participants to write essays and giving negative 
feedback in return. To measure moral judgment, they presented participants with 40 moral 
scenarios and had participants answer questions such as, “Is it morally permissible for the 
protagonist to do x?” (Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012, p. 582). They found that anger caused 
moral judgments to be more permissible and disgust caused judgments to be less permissible. 
Such studies show that in relation to one’s moral judgment, the type of emotion one experiences 
is very important in determining whether it will influence one’s moral judgment. 
One’s affective state, or overall mood within a certain context, also plays an important 
factor in shaping moral judgment. In their research study, Valdesolo and Desteno (2006) induced 
either positive affects or neutral affects in their subjects and subsequently presented them with 
the well-known footbridge dilemma. This sort of moral dilemma allows subjects to either choose 
a utilitarian response (i.e., pushing a large man off the footbridge to prevent the loss of five lives) 
or a non-utilitarian response (i.e., leaving the large man alone and letting the runaway trolley kill 
five people). When presented with this dilemma, the researchers noted that a vast majority of 
people believed the utilitarian response to be wrong, or immoral. Valdesolo and Desteno found 
in their study that participants induced to be in a heightened positive affective state were more 
likely than participants in the neutral state to choose the utilitarian response. That is, participants 
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inducted to be in the context of a positive environment showed a significant shift in judging the 
utilitarian response as the right, or moral, response to the footbridge dilemma. Studies like these 
strongly suggest that individuals can be influenced and shaped by the emotional and 
environmental contexts they are in during moral evaluation. 
Priming subjects with scientific concepts have also been shown to significantly affect 
individuals’ moral judgment. Ma-Kellams and Blascovich (2013) found in their study that when 
presented with a rape vignette to evaluate, subjects primed to think about lay notions of science 
(e.g., rationality, impartiality, technological progress, fairness) exhibited endorsement of stricter 
moral ideals and judged the transgression to be significantly more immoral than participants in 
the neutral prime condition. In this study, the researchers operationally defined “moral judgment” 
as a wide range of evaluations of behaviors that include judgments such as wrongness and 
appropriateness. Ma-Kellams and Blascovich argued that their results suggest and provide 
support for the notion that the study of science in and of itself holds normative implications and 
leads to certain moral outcomes. Psychologists are not only interested in the factors that 
influence moral judgment, but are also interested in the factors that influence moral behavior. 
 Moral judgment and behavior. Existing literature related to morality have shown that 
individuals’ moral behaviors are very susceptible to certain primes. In one study, priming 
individuals with God concepts using target words such as “spirit,” “divine,” “God,” and “sacred” 
led them to exhibit significantly more prosocial, or moral, behavior in a game of anonymous 
money-giving compared to individuals primed with neutral concepts (Sharrif & Norensayan, 
2007). The researchers in this study designed their anonymous economic game as such: 
participants were given ten one-dollar coins and were told they could keep as many of the coins 
as they would like, and that the coins they left would anonymously be given to a “receiver 
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subject.” Sharrif and Norensayan found that a higher proportion of participants behaved 
fairly/morally (i.e., taking and leaving exactly $5) in the religious-prime condition in comparison 
to the control condition, t(48)=3.69, p<.001. Specifically, 52% of those in the religious-prime 
condition displayed moral behavior in the anonymous economic game, whereas only 12% of 
those in the control condition displayed the same moral behavior of equally splitting the coins. In 
line with Ma-Kellams and Blascovich’s (2013) argument, Sharrif and Norensayan (2007) 
proposed that religious or supernatural concepts, when activated, may cause individuals to 
implicitly associate these concepts with prosocial and fair acts, thus causing them to exhibit more 
moral behavior.  
Studies on perceived decision-freedom and morality. A number of studies have been 
conducted on the relation between perceived freedom and moral judgment. Kane, Joseph, and 
Tedeschi (1977) investigated whether differences in decision freedom of a depicted transgressor 
would affect participants’ attributions of responsibility and assignments of punishment. They 
presented subjects with a scenario involving a Mr. X who embezzles $50,000 from his 
corporation and then asked them to make judgments about the morality of the action. The 
researchers tested and measured moral judgment by asking subjects (on a scale) questions 
pertaining to how much responsibility they would attribute to Mr. X’s transgressions and the 
amount of punishment they would assign, if any. Perceived freedom was manipulated by varying 
the degrees of constraints and justifications operating on Mr. X preceding his decision to 
embezzle the money. For example, in one scenario Mr. X was under no constraint when he 
decided to embezzle (hereafter, “scenario A”), whereas another scenario Mr. X was under the 
constraint that his wife and daughter were kidnapped for a ransom of $50,000, and the threatener 
demanded that Mr. X acquire the ransom by embezzling from his corporation (hereafter, 
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“scenario B”). Subjects reported perceiving Mr. X as more free when presented with scenarios 
that involved less situational constraints such as scenario A, and less free when presented with 
scenarios that involved certain constraints and external coercion such as scenario B.  
As a result, Kane et al. (1977) found this general correlation: when subjects perceived Mr. 
X as more free, they attributed more moral responsibility for his embezzlement. The researchers 
proposed that perceived degree of freedom regarding an agent’s choice correlates with the 
amount and magnitude of dispositional attributions and responsibility assigned towards the agent. 
Dispositional attribution refers to the act of attributing internal characteristics (e.g., 
aggressiveness, exploitive, trustworthy) to an individual’s behavior instead of external influences. 
Woolfork, Doris, and Darley (2006) found similar results in a study where they not only 
varied the degree of freedom in an agent’s decision to commit homicide, but also varied the 
degree to which the agent accepted ownership, or identified, with his decision. Again, degree of 
agent’s freedom of choice positively correlated with participants’ attributions of moral 
responsibility. With respect to agent identification, the researchers found a positive correlation 
between agent’s endorsement and accepted ownership of his decision and participants’ 
attributions of moral responsibility, even if the agent was under extremely powerful constraints. 
In their studies, Kane et al. (1977) and Woolfolk et al. (2006) examined moral judgment, 
as measured by attributions of moral responsibility and punishment, in relation to decision 
freedom, which they conceptualized as the extent to which an agent was able to decide freely to 
perform a particular act, given different degrees of constraints and coercion from external factors. 
In the current study, we take a different approach by examining moral judgment as a function of 
different free will beliefs. This approach is motivated both by the findings of Kane et al. (1977) 
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and Woolfolk et al. (2006), and also by longstanding philosophical debates concerning the 
intuitive relationship between free will and moral responsibility.  
Philosophical Background 
The problem of free will. The ancient philosophical problem of whether or not we as 
human agents have free will in a world that appears to be governed by set laws of nature still 
remains to be one of the most deadlocked topics of debate in Western philosophy (Nichols & 
Knobe, 2007). At the very basic level, this philosophical problem begins with the question of 
whether our world is deterministic or indeterministic. “Determinism” is the view that “every 
event [including human behavior and decision-making] is an inevitable consequence of the prior 
conditions and the natural laws [of our world]” (Nichols & Knobe, 2007, p. 663). That is, 
determinism is the view that we have no free will because our choices and actions are necessarily 
caused by antecedent states of affairs. “Indeterminism” (hereafter, “free will”) is the opposite 
view—that is, it is the view that we have free will and that events, as well as human behavior and 
decision-making, are not causally determined by prior conditions, antecedent events, and natural 
laws. The present study uses these definitions to operationally define the concepts that subjects 
will be primed to believe in, depending if they are in the “determinism” condition or the “free 
will” condition. Free will and determinism, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A 
major philosophical school of thought is “compatibilism,” which holds that free will and 
determinism can co-exist (Nahmias, 2006). This view is directly connected to “moral 
compatibilism,” which is discussed in the following section. 
  Free will and moral responsibility. Closely tied to “the problem of free will” debate is 
the question of moral responsibility—more specifically, whether agents can be morally 
responsible for their actions if it turns out to be true that we live in a deterministic world. Again, 
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at the basic level, there are two overarching views: “moral compatibilism” and “moral 
incompatibilism” (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Proponents of moral incompatibilism hold the view 
that if determinism is true, people are not fully morally responsible for their behaviors, whereas 
proponents of moral compatibilism maintain the view that our moral responsibility is not 
undermined in the slightest even if determinism is true (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). While studies 
on free will and moral judgment are scarce in the current literature, some studies have focused 
purely on perceptions of free will and moral responsibility. A recent study by Ogletree and 
Oberle (2008) found a positive correlation between perceptions of moral responsibility and belief 
in free will, which is what the current study hopes to find. Furthermore, studies examining the 
effects of free will belief on moral behavior provide further support for this expectation. 
Studies on free will belief and moral behavior. Research in the area of free will and 
moral behavior is scarce, but growing rapidly. These studies have rendered strong theoretical, 
societal, and practical implications that result from endorsing deterministic worldviews as 
opposed to free will worldviews, and vice versa. Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that belief in 
no free will increased the immoral behavior of cheating in their participants. In their study, Vohs 
and Schooler operationally defined belief in no free will as determinism. They manipulated 
participants’ beliefs about the existence of free will by giving each participant a booklet of 
fifteen statements and instructing them to think about and internalize each statement for one 
minute before turning the page. The statements each participant received differed depending on 
whether they were assigned to the free will condition (e.g., I am able to override the genetic and 
environmental factors that sometimes influence my behavior), the determinism condition (e.g., A 
belief in free will contradicts the known fact that the universe is governed by lawful principles of 
science), or the neutral condition (e.g., Sugar cane are grown in 112 countries). The researchers 
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found this manipulation to be effective in altering participants’ free will beliefs according to their 
assigned conditions. Participants were then asked to take a fifteen problem GRE practice test.  In 
order to orchestrate an opportunity to cheat, the experimenter overlooking the participants 
feigned a sudden realization that she was late to a meeting and instructed the participants to self-
grade and self-pay themselves for the number of questions they answered correctly before 
rushing off to her “meeting”. As a result, those in the determinism condition paid themselves 
significantly more money than those in the free will and neutral condition. Vohs and Schooler 
proposed the theories that endorsing a deterministic worldview may undermine an individual’s 
sense of self-agency, may lead an individual to accept a ‘why bother’ mentality, or that such an 
outlook would provide the ultimate excuse for an individual to behave however she pleases.  
Research on free will and moral behavior has also rendered practical implications 
pertaining to the job force, an important realm of American society. Studies have found that 
differences in beliefs about free will affect individual’s career outlooks and job performances. In 
undergraduates, belief in free will was found to function as a strong predictor of positive 
expected job performance. In current employees, belief in free will was positively correlated 
with overall job performance—that is, employees who endorsed a free will outlook received 
significantly better assessments of workplace performance by their supervisors as opposed to 
their determinism-endorsing counterparts (Stillman et al., 2010). Stillman et al. proposed that 
belief in free will may enhance one’s executive function, which refers to the aspect of the self 
that is responsible for one’s actions by regulating one’s cognitive functions. This seems to be a 
viable theory, as an enhanced executive function could cause more self-regulation and self-
control and certainly account for enhanced job performance. On the other hand, along the same 
lines as Vohs and Schooler’s (2008) propositions, Stillman et al. (2010) suggested that belief in 
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determinism may undermine one’s motivation to perform well at their jobs and deplete one’s 
ability to self-regulate, and encourage laziness in the work force. In other words, a deterministic 
outlook may encourage unfair and immoral behavior.  
In a study that sought to replicate and extend Vohs and Schooler’s (2008) study on 
cheating and to also test the effects of different free will beliefs on helping behavior and 
aggression, researchers found that participants in the determinism condition were less likely to 
report that they would offer help to people depicted in hypothetical scenarios that were in need of 
assistance. Participants in the determinism condition also showed significantly increased 
aggressive behavior in comparison to the free will and neutral conditions (Baumeister, 
Masicampo, DeWall, 2009). Essentially, Baumeister et al.’s study showed that endorsing a free 
will outlook may provide prosocial benefits to society. They argued that endorsing a free will 
worldview may promote moral behaviors such as helpfulness and reduced aggression by 
fostering a sense of thoughtful reflection and willingness to exert energy. On the other hand, the 
researchers argued that their results support the theory that endorsing a deterministic outlook 
may serve as a subtle prime for an individual to displace her self-control and cause her behavior 
to rely on selfish, automatic impulses, which in general are antisocial and immoral behaviors.  
Present Study 
Despite the long history of research in moral judgment and in free will separately, few 
studies have examined the effects of different free will beliefs on individual’s judgments 
regarding the morality of other’s behaviors. The studies in the previous section have identified 
free will beliefs as a strong factor that may play a part in shaping society’s moral norms and 
individuals’ moral behaviors. If differences in free will belief have such a striking influential 
effect, it is then important to further examine the extent and scope of other possible constructs, 
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such as moral judgment, that may be significantly influenced by free will beliefs. Like concepts 
of “science” and “God” (Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 2013; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), free 
will and determinism as concepts may in and of themselves hold certain moral implications. In 
line with Ugazio et al.’s (2012) study that identified anger and disgust as significant emotions 
that influence moral judgment, a belief in free will or determinism may also elicit emotions that 
significantly affect individuals’ moral judgment. Studies related to those conducted by Kane et al. 
(1977) and Woolfork et al. (2006) that identified strong correlations between perceived decision-
freedom and moral judgments serve as strong evidence to suggest that similar correlational 
outcomes should result from the present study. The purpose of the present study is to investigate 
whether differences in free will belief will influence individuals’ moral judgment in different 
ways. 
Like Vohs and Schooler (2008), the present study will have three conditions: free will 
frame, determinism frame, and neutral frame. Participants will be randomly assigned to each 
condition and their beliefs will be manipulated using the same statement internalization method 
as Vohs and Schooler. A manipulation check will take place before the experiment, as well as 
after the experiment. These two manipulation checks will be designed using a modified version 
of Paulhus and Carey’s (2011) Free will and Determinism scale (FAD-Plus). Subsequently, 
participants will be presented with three morally questionable scenarios differing by context and 
will be asked to morally judge the agent in question from each scenario. Moral judgment will be 
measured through four moral constructs: moral evaluation, moral responsibility, justification, 
and punishment. We are unsure whether there will be an effect of scenario context and moral 
construct type. Moral judgment may vary across scenario and moral construct types, but overall 
we predict that (1) determinism participants will judge the agents less harshly overall than free 
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will participants, (2) determinism participants will attribute less moral responsibility to the 
agents in question compared to free will participants, and (3) free will participants will attribute 
more responsibility to the agents in question compared to neutral participants.  
Method 
Participants 
 A convenience sample of 56 undergraduates from the Claremont Colleges (34 females, 
22 males) between the ages of 17 to 22 (m=19.72) was selected for this study. They were 
recruited through the Claremont Colleges Sona Systems. For compensation, participants received  
course credit. 
Materials 
 The present study adapted its experimental manipulation from Vohs and Schooler’s 
(2008) statement internalization method, which has been shown to be an effective manipulation 
in a number of other studies related to free will (Stillman et al., 2010; Baumeister et al., 2009). 
This manipulation involved presenting each participant with 15 statements in support of either 
free will, determinism, or neither (see Appendix A). Hereafter, we will refer to these conditions 
as the free will frame, the determinism frame, and the neutral frame. Three morally questionable 
scenarios were constructed for all participants to read. These scenarios differed by context (see 
Appendix B). The first scenario concerned the politically controversial topic of euthanasia. The 
second scenario concerned a college student cheating, and the third scenario involved 
embezzlement, or stealing. We developed a moral judgment questionnaire to measure 
participants’ moral judgments (see Appendix B). These questions measured four different moral 
constructs: moral evaluation, moral responsibility attribution, perceived justification, and 
assignment of punishment. Participants answered each question on a 1 to 6 scale, where higher 
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ratings indicated harsher judgment. The four moral constructs each corresponded with two 
questions from the moral judgment questionnaire. For a post-test manipulation check, a Free 
Will & Determinism Questionnaire (FWD-Q) was constructed using questions from Paulhus and 
Carey’s (2011) FAD-Plus scale (see Appendix C). The FWD-Q measured participants’ lay 
beliefs in free will and determinism. Participants rated 18 statements on a 1 – 5 scale with higher 
ratings indicating greater endorsement. Of the 18 statements, six measured belief in free will and 
another six measured belief in determinism.  
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to the free will, determinism, or neutral frame. They 
were run in Claremont McKenna College’s Cognitive Neuroscience laboratory and Kravis 
computer lab. Participants were asked to sit at a computer and were given written instructions to 
follow. Every aspect of the experiment took place on the computer; participants read the 
scenarios and answered moral judgment questions on E-Prime 2.0 software, and they completed 
the FWD-Q on Google Docs at the end of the session.  
To manipulate individual’s perceptions of free will, participants were presented with 15 
statements that appeared one at a time on the computer screen. Each statement was set to appear 
for 20 seconds until the computer emitted a bell sound to indicate that the next statement was 
about to appear, and to ensure proper attention. Participants were instructed to think deeply about 
each statement for the duration that each statement remained on the screen. In the determinism 
frame, subjects read sentences in support of determinism such as, “Science has demonstrated that 
free will is an illusion.” Those in the free will frame read sentences in support of free will such as, 
“Our actions and thoughts are not simply the result of prior experiences.” The neutral frame 
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group read worldly trivia facts that supported neither free will nor determinism such as, 
“Monarch butterflies fly slowly but have been sighted hundreds of miles at sea.” 
Following the experimental manipulation, participants read three short scenarios, 
differing by context. After reading each scenario, participants rated questions from the moral 
judgment questionnaire on the computer (Appendix B). Higher ratings on the scale indicated 
harsher moral judgment while lower ratings indicated lighter moral judgment. Examples of 
questions from the moral judgment questionnaire include, “How morally responsible was Dr. 
Jefferson for his behavior?” and “How right was Dr. Jefferson’s behavior?” The final question, 
which measured attribution of punishment, offered participants 6 possible punishments to choose 
from to assign to the alleged perpetrator from each scenario. The way this final question was 
scored was consistent with the rest of the questionnaire—i.e., the severity of possible 
punishments ranged from less harsh to very harsh. For example, the possible punishments 
available for the first scenario started with “No prison time” and ended with “9-10 years prison 
time.” The options offered in between gradually increased in severity from start to end. Overall, 
the structure of and the type of questions included in the moral judgment questionnaire were 
consistent across scenarios, save for the names that were changed to match the different 
individuals in question and the final question of each type of questionnaire. This yielded three 
types of moral judgment questionnaires, one per scenario. The final question for each type of 
moral judgment questionnaire was slightly altered for each scenario so that the punishments to 
choose from realistically reflected the particular behavior in question. Importantly though, the 
order of the possible punishments offered and the scoring were consistent across scenarios. 
Following the moral scenario and moral judgment phase of the study, participants were 
instructed to complete the FWD-Q, which served as a post-test manipulation check (Appendix C). 
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This questionnaire was untitled and began with the instructions: “For each statement below, 
choose a number from 1 (Totally Disagree) to 5 (Totally Agree) to indicate how much you agree 
or disagree.” Each statement measured a concept of free will, determinism, or randomness. For 
the purposes of our study, we were only interested in the free will and determinism statements. 
Statements representative of free will included ones such as, “People are always at fault for their 
bad behavior” and “Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires.” Statements 
representative of determinism included ones such as, “As with other animals, human behavior 
always follows the laws of nature” and “Your genes determine your future.” After completing 
the FWD-Q, participants were debriefed and given course credit. 
Results and Discussion 
Was the framing manipulation effective? Manipulation check. 
Previous studies have shown that free will frame leads to higher free will scores, and that 
determinism frame leads to weaker free will scores (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 
2009). In these studies, the researchers grouped participants by frame, since their framing 
manipulation caused significant differences in reported free will beliefs. To assess whether we 
had similar effects, we conducted a one-way MANOVA with frame as a factor on free will and 
determinism scores from the FWD-Q. We observed no significant effect of frame on FWD-Q 
free will scores, F(4, 106) = .79, p =.537, ηp2 = .029. Participants from the free will frame did not 
report stronger free will scores (M = 20.74, SD = .82) than participants from the determinism 
frame (M =22.0, SD =.86), nor did they report significantly different scores than participants 
from the neutral frame (M = 21.0, SD =.80), F(2, 53) = .62, p = .540, ηp2 = .023. There was also 
no significant effect of frame on determinism scores, F(2, 53) = .99, p = .378, ηp2 = .036. 
Participants from the determinism frame did not report stronger determinism scores (M = 13.12, 
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SD =.84) than participants from the free will frame (M = 13.16, SD =.80) or neutral frame (M = 
14.50, SD =.78). Because our framing manipulation was ineffective, we grouped participants 
according to their FWD-Q ratings, which reflected their actual lay beliefs.1 Similar methods have 
been adopted in previous studies (Stillman et al., 2010). 
Individual difference measure scores. To classify participants as endorsing free will or 
determinism, we calculated post-test disposition FWD-Q measures as per Paulhus and Carey’s 
(2011) instructions. We calculated separate free will and determinism scores for each participant 
by summing their six individual ratings from the free will and the deterministic statements, 
respectively. On average, participants rated higher than the minimum score of 6 for both free will 
scores (M = 21.21, SD = 3.53) and determinism scores (M = 13.63, SD = 3.47)  
 To create a grouping variable that took into account participants’ beliefs about both free 
will and determinism, we performed median splits on the sample’s scores. First, we performed a 
median split on free will scores (Mdn = 22) and created a categorical variable to distinguish 
participants who believe more and less strongly in free will concepts. Participants who scored 
above the median of 22 were grouped as Free Will (FW) (n = 35), and those who scored lower 
than 22 were grouped as Non Free Will (NFW) (n = 21). Second, we performed a median split 
on determinism scores (Mdn = 13.5). Participants who scored above the median of 13.5 were 
grouped as the Deterministic, indicating greater belief in deterministic concepts (D, n =32), and 
those who scored lower than 13.5 were grouped as the Non-deterministic (ND, n= 24), 
indicating less belief in deterministic concepts. The combination of these two variables yielded 
four belief categories. According to their group placements, participants fell under one of four 
categories: Deterministic and Free Will (D-FW), Deterministic and Non Free Will (D-NFW), 
                                                        
1 Pre- and post-test manipulation checks showed that participants’ free will beliefs at the beginning and end of the 
experiment did not significantly differ, z = 1.80, p = .072.  
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Non-deterministic and Free Will (ND-FW), or Non-deterministic and Non Free Will (ND-NFW). 
Of particular interest were the D-NFW participants and the ND-FW participants, as the former 
combination indicates a strong endorsement of determinism and the latter indicates a strong 
endorsement of free will. The D-FW participants were also of particular interest, as such a 
combination of beliefs represents compatibilism. The ND-NFW group was not of particular 
interest, for lack of belief in both determinism and free will is not an established or popular 
world belief, nor was it within the scope of interest for the present study. There were also too few 
participants who identified as ND-NFW (n = 9) relative to the other groups. Thus, we did not 
include ND-NFW participants in our categorical variable of “group belief” for our analysis. 
 Rating scores. Mean moral judgment ratings were calculated for each scenario and moral 
construct for each participant. The questionnaire for each scenario type contained eight relevant 
moral judgment questions that measured the four individual moral constructs: moral evaluation, 
moral responsibility, justification, and punishement; i.e., two questions per construct. For every 
participant, we averaged the two ratings from the moral judgment questions that corresponded 
with each construct. Thus, given three scenarios and four constructs, each participant yielded 
twelve mean moral judgment ratings.  
Moral Judgment Data 
To determine if free will belief, and deterministic belief affected moral judgments 
differently for different scenarios and constructs, we conducted a mixed-model MANOVA with 
two between subjects factors of group belief (3: D-NFW, ND-FW, D-FW) and frame (3: free 
will, determinism, and neutral) and two within-subject factors of scenario (3: euthanasia, 
cheating, and stealing), and construct (4: moral evaluation, moral judgment, justification, and 
punishment) on moral judgment ratings. The factors scenario and construct yielded significant 
MULTIFACED NATURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                                                21 
 
main effects. For the scenario effect, F(2, 37) = 2.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .843, the cheating scenario 
consistently received the highest (and thus harshest) overall judgment ratings (M = 4.83, SD 
= .09), and the euthanasia scenario consistently received the lowest ratings (M = 2.92, SD = .13), 
with the stealing scenario falling somewhere in between (M =4.04, SD = .11). Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that all three scenario types significantly differed from each other, t(110) = 
83.14, p < .001; t(110) = 35.50, p < .000; t(110) = 47.80, p < .001. This pattern suggests that 
situational context influences robustly the severity of our moral judgment of other individual’s 
morally questionable behavior.  
The significant construct type effect, F(3, 36) = 2.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .922, indicated that 
moral responsibility was rated the highest by participants (M =5.25, SD = .13), followed by 
moral evaluation (M = 4.15, SD = .09) and punishment (M = 3.29, SD = .09), and ending with 
justification (M = 3.05, SD = .13). Pairwise comparisons revealed that all four moral construct 
types significantly differed from one another. However, a scenario x construct interaction 
indicated that different scenarios emphasized different constructs, F(6, 33) = 28.42, p < .001, ηp2 
= .838 (Figure 1).  
There was no significant effect of group belief, F(2, 38) = .34, p = .711, ηp2 = .018. Mean 
judgment ratings did not differ between D-NFW participants (M = 3.97, SD =.13), ND-FW 
participants (M = 3.84, SD = .14), and D-FW participants (M = 4.00, SD = .15). 
However, we found a significant group belief x scenario x construct interaction showing 
that judgment ratings for the individual constructs did indeed differ between group belief types, 
depending on scenario type, F(12, 68) = 1.97, p = .040, ηp2 = .258 (Figure 2).  D-FW 
(compatibilist) participants showed the most stable ratings for constructs moral evaluation and 
moral responsibility across all scenario types, but particularly for the cheating and stealing 
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scenarios. D-NFW (determinism) participants rated moral evaluation and moral responsibility 
the highest for all scenarios except euthanasia. Across scenario types, D-NFW participants 
showed the lowest punishment ratings while D-FW participants showed the highest. ND-FW 
(free will) participants did not exhibit any ratings that were consistently higher or lower 
compared to D-NFW and D-FW participants. 
Lastly, it is important to note that there was no main effect of frame, F(2, 38) = 2.01, p 
= .148, ηp2 = .096. Furthermore, frame did not interact with scenario, F(4, 76) = .60, p = .667, ηp2 
= .030, construct, F(6, 74) = 1.32, p = .246, ηp2 = .099, or group belief, F(4, 38) = .57, p = .683, 
ηp
2 
= .057. 
General Discussion 
 In this study, we investigated how philosophical beliefs about the world might influence 
moral judgment. Specifically, we investigated whether different free will and deterministic 
beliefs, as well as different situational contexts, affected moral judgment. Another question of 
focus was whether severity of judgments would vary by moral construct type. Our experiment 
attempted to manipulate free will beliefs by priming participants with statements in support of 
free will or determinism. Participants then read three scenarios that differed by situational 
context, each followed by a moral judgment questionnaire that measured four moral constructs. 
At the end of each session, participants completed the FWD-Q that measured their lay beliefs in 
free will and determinism. We grouped participants by combined free will and deterministic 
belief based on their FWD-Q ratings.  Our results showed no effects of frame. However, several 
of our research questions were addressed. We found that situational context had a significant 
effect on participants’ moral judgments. Furthermore, we observed that judgment ratings differed 
depending on the moral construct being measured. The relative reliance of these construct ratings 
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depended on situational context. Lastly, different free will beliefs did influence moral judgment, 
but only to a small degree relative to situational context. Overall, these results emphasize the 
complex and multifaceted nature of moral judgment.  
Our scenario effect demonstrates the importance of situational context in determining 
moral judgment. Participants’ judgment ratings were not consistent across scenario types, 
showing that moral judgments vary depending on the situation in question. In our experiment, 
higher ratings implied harsher judgment. The cheating scenario, which depicted an intelligent 
and otherwise virtuous college student, received the harshest overall judgment ratings. The 
euthanasia scenario, which depicted the mercy killing of a terminally ill patient at the end of her 
life, received the least harsh judgment ratings. Because our sample population comprised college 
students from top-ranked liberal arts colleges, these results suggest that moral judgments vary as 
a function of personal relevance.  
 Our finding that judgment ratings significantly differed by moral construct type shows 
that moral judgment is multidimensional. That is, the idea of moral judgment cannot be 
characterized as a single concept; rather, it is an amalgamation of different but related elements, 
which the current study measured through different moral constructs. Our significant construct 
effect suggests that moral judgments are not formed on the basis of a single consideration. Of the 
four constructs, moral responsibility received the highest ratings with a mean of 5.25 (SD= .13). 
Since the scale ranged from 1 to 6, this result implies that participants considered the agents in 
question as almost entirely responsible for their morally questionable transgressions, regardless 
of the situational context. Perceived justification received the lowest ratings (M= 3.05, SD= .13), 
indicating that some moral judgment considerations load more than others.  
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The interaction of construct and scenario showed that situational context influenced 
construct ratings overall. Our results suggest that situational context robustly influences 
evaluations of morality, perceived justification, and assignments of punishment, but affects 
attributions of moral responsibility the least. These data suggest that some moral judgment 
constructs are easily influenced by situational context (e.g., moral evaluation), while others are 
less affected by a large degree, like moral responsibility (Figure 1a). Regardless, situational 
context still predicted the harshness of judgment ratings across construct types. In other words, 
we observed the same scenario effect pattern for all four construct types—the cheating and 
euthanasia scenarios consistently received the harshest and lowest judgment ratings, respectively. 
This constant pattern further emphasizes the crucial role that situational context plays in moral 
judgment, and lends more support to our theory that severity of moral judgment depends on 
personal relevance. 
Our results show that longer standing philosophical beliefs about free will and 
determinism influenced moral judgments more than free will and deterministic primes, since we 
found no frame effects. FWD-Q mean free will and determinism scores indicate that overall, 
participants endorsed free will notions more than deterministic notions.  
Different philosophical beliefs slightly influenced moral judgment. For sake of clarity, 
“ND-FW,” “D-NFW,” and “ND-FW” will hereafter be used interchangeably with “free will,” 
“determinism,” and “compatibilism,” respectively. Our group belief x scenario x construct 
interaction showed that compatibilism participants rated moral evaluation and responsibility 
most consistently across scenario types, but particularly for cheating and stealing. This suggests 
that compatibilist participants’ moral judgment was least influenced by situational context.  
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Of the three belief types, determinism participants rated the euthanasia scenario the 
lowest for all constructs. However, they had the highest overall moral evaluation and 
responsibility ratings for the cheating and stealing scenarios compared to free will and 
compatibilist participants. Together these results suggest that deterministic belief only influences 
moral judgment under certain situational contexts (i.e, euthanasia). On the other hand, free will 
belief did not seem to noticeably influence moral judgment at all, since ND-FW participants did 
not show any ratings that were consistently higher or lower than D-NFW and D-FW participants. 
Lastly, determinism participants selected the least amount of punishment for the agents in 
question for all scenario types. Broadly, these results demonstrate that different philosophical 
beliefs, particularly deterministic and compatibilist belief interact with situational context in 
different ways to affect moral judgment.  
Our first prediction was that determinism participants would judge the agents in question 
less harshly overall compared to free will participants. We cannot conclude that our results 
validate this hypothesis, since deterministic judgment ratings were inconsistent across scenarios 
and construct type. However, determinism participants did judge the agents in question less 
harshly in terms of punishment assignment compared to free will participants. Since the concept 
of determinism implies complete lack of decision freedom, this effect fits well with Kane et al.’s 
(1977) finding that subjects’ selected amount of punishment for an agent in question correlated 
with the amount of decision freedom they perceived the agent to have. 
Our second prediction was that determinism participants would attribute less moral 
responsibility to the agents in question compared to free will participants. Again, we cannot 
conclude that our results support this prediction. While determinism participants attributed less 
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moral responsibility for the euthanasia scenario compared to the free will participants, we did not 
observe the same effect for the cheating and stealing scenario.  
 Finally, our third prediction that free will participants would attribute more responsibility 
to the agents in question compared to neutral participants was nullified due to our lack of frame 
manipulation effect. 
To date, there exist very few studies in the moral psychology literature that look at the 
effects of different free will beliefs on moral judgment. The current study adds to this growing 
area of interest with some notable findings. First, our results are in opposition to recent studies 
that have found positive correlations between perceptions of moral responsibility and belief in 
free will (Ogletree & Oberle, 2008). One possible explanation for this may be that the questions 
used by Ogletree and Oberle to assess moral responsibility did not provide background context. 
In their study, the researchers measured moral responsibility by asking the question, “People 
who commit crimes or hurt someone are morally responsible for their behavior and should 
expect to receive appropriate consequences for their actions.” (p. 104.) Ogletree and Oberle also 
compounded moral responsibility and punishment together into one measure, whereas the 
measures in our study did not. Second, we show that differences in philosophical beliefs do not 
robustly influence moral judgment in the same way that different beliefs have been shown to 
affect moral behavior. Instead, we identify situational context as a stronger overriding factor in 
determining moral judgment. Finally, our findings align with a recent study that is forthcoming 
in Psychological Science, which found that reduced belief in free will led to lighter assignments 
of punishment (Shariff et al., forthcoming).  
Our convenience sample of college students presents a limitation to our study. It may be 
possible that lay philosophical beliefs about free will may be more developed in older adults, 
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which may yield stronger effects on moral judgment. It may be of interest for future studies to 
explore this possibility. Furthermore, similar longitudinal studies may help to test our theory that 
personal relevance plays a role in determining how situational context affects moral judgment.  
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Figure 1. Interaction effect of scenario and moral construct type on judgment ratings 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
ME MR J P
R
a
ti
n
g
s
Moral Construct Type
Euthenasia
Cheating
Stealing
MULTIFACED NATURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT                                                                31 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Moral evaluation ratings vs. moral responsibility ratings across scenario types 
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Figure 2. Scenario x Construct x Group belief interaction
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Free Will Manipulation: Neutral Statements 
1. Oceans cover 71% of the earth's surface. 
 
2. Alkaline power cells generally work longer than ordinary batteries. 
 
3. Monarch butterflies fly slowly but have been sighted hundreds of miles at sea. 
 
4. The Olympics are held every four years. 
 
5. Half a day's boat ride away from Athens lies the isle of Mykonos. 
 
6. Sugar cane and sugar beets are grown in 112 countries. 
 
7. Many of the mountain peaks in the Rockies are over 14,000 feet high. 
 
8. The Appalachian Highlands are worn down mountains and plateaus stretching from the 
northern Alabama to the St. Lawrence River in Canada. 
 
9. The greatest distance the earth is from the sun is 94,452,000 miles. 
 
10. The Nile River in Africa is the world's longest river. 
 
11. The Los Angeles metropolitan area is known for its complex system of highways. 
 
12. Most appliances are guaranteed for a full year against defects. 
 
13. Pocket calculators became common items only after 1970. 
 
14. Inventories are most frequently taken either at the beginning or at the end of the month. 
 
15. Organically grown foods are more popular in recent decades. 
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Free Will Manipulation: Deterministic Statements 
 
1. Ultimately, we are biological computers - designed by evolution, built through genetics,    
and programmed by the environment. 
 
2. The brain is a complex machine capable of carrying out extremely sophisticated 
behaviors. 
 
3. Science has demonstrated that free will is an illusion. 
 
4. It is likely that scientists will eventually understand how the feeling of personal 
experience results from neurons firing in the brain. 
 
5. Everything a person does is a direct consequence of their environment and genetic 
makeup. 
 
6. Once scientists understand enough about the physical principles underlying behavior, 
they should be able to precisely predict a person’s future actions based solely on that 
person’s genetics and prior experiences. 
 
7. Our actions are determined by what we have experienced in the past combined with the 
specific genetic predispositions that we have. 
 
8. Like everything else in the universe, all human actions follow from prior events and 
ultimately can be understood in terms of the movement of molecules. 
 
9. A belief in free will contradicts the known fact that the universe is governed by lawful 
principles of science. 
 
10. Our mental activities are exclusively the product of physical processes. 
 
11. Every action that a person takes is caused by a specific pattern of neural firings in the 
brain. 
 
12. All behavior is determined by brain activity, which in turn is determined by a 
combination of environmental and genetic factors. 
 
13. People often claim that they have free will, but all they really have is the experience of 
making choices. 
 
14. Just as science has shown that physical movement is merely forces of gravity combined 
with muscular force, scientists are now realizing that personal thoughts, feelings, and 
beliefs are similarly controlled by basic physical processes. 
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15. Even if some behaviors are not actually pre-determined, this does not mean there is free 
will, as random actions are no more under our control than are those caused by prior 
events. 
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Free Will Manipulation: Free Will Statements 
1. I demonstrate my free will everyday when I make decisions. 
 
2. I am able to override the genetic and environmental factors that sometimes influence my 
behavior.  
 
3. I have feelings of regret when I make bad decisions because I know that ultimately I am 
responsible for my actions. 
 
4. I take personal pride in good decisions I have made in the past because I know that, at the 
time, I had the freedom to and could have made a bad decision. 
 
5. Avoiding temptation requires that I exert my free will. 
 
6. Ultimately people cannot blame their own actions on anything other than themselves. 
 
7. I have free will to control my actions and, ultimately, to control my destiny in life.  
 
8. I am more than a robot that has been programmed by genetics and the environment, no 
matter what a few scientists claim. 
 
9. People are responsible for their behaviors because they have free will to control their 
actions. 
 
10. Our actions and thoughts are not simply the result of prior experiences. 
 
11. By exerting their free will, people can and do overcome the negative effects of a 
dysfunctional environment. 
 
12. It has been shown that mental experience cannot be completely reduced to physical 
causes.  
 
13. There are many things that science still cannot explain, so it does not trouble me that 
science cannot offer an explanation for free will. 
 
14. Given that I have had personal experiences that science cannot explain, I also know that I 
have free will even if science cannot explain it. 
 
15. By exerting my will, I overcome the physical factors that influence my behavior and 
experience true freedom. 
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Appendix B 
Moral Scenarios and Moral Judgment Questionnaires 
Choose the Outcome (Dr. Jefferson) 
 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions below IN ORDER: 
There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there was no treatment known to medicine 
that would save her. Her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, knew that she had only about six months to live. 
She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of a painkiller like ether or 
morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her 
calm periods she would ask Dr. Jefferson to give her enough ether to kill her. She said she 
couldn’t stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months anyway. Although he knows 
that mercy killing is against the law, the doctor ultimate decides to grant her request. 
 
 
1. How right was Dr. Jefferson’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
       Very Right             Very Wrong 
2. How moral was Dr. Jefferson’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
         Very Moral              Very Immoral 
3. How responsible was Dr. Jefferson for his behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
      Not at all responsible             Entirely Responsible 
4. How ethical was Dr. Jefferson’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
     Very ethical               Very unethical 
5. How justified was Dr. Jefferson’s action? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Entirely Justified           Not at all justified 
6. How rational was Dr. Jefferson’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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      Very rational               Very irrational 
7. To what extent did Dr. Jefferson have good reasons for his behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Very good reasons              No good reasons at all 
8. Do you think Dr. Jefferson should be held legally responsible for his actions? 
Yes No Not Sure 
9. How guilty is Dr. Jefferson? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
      Not guilty at all            Very guilty 
10. The scenario you were presented with occurred in Georgia. According to Georgia law, 
assisted suicide is punishable by 1 to 10 years imprisonment. If you were on the jury and 
had to assign one of the following options for Dr. Jefferson, which would you choose? 
Please mark one choice. 
_____ No prison time 
_____ 1-2 years prison time 
_____ 3-4 years prison time 
_____ 5-6 years prison time 
_____ 7-8 years prison time 
_____ 9-10 years prison time 
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Choose the Outcome (Mary) 
 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions below IN ORDER: 
Mary is a 3rd-year college student in good standing. All through her academic years, she has 
obtained straight A’s, has made the Dean’s List multiple times, has many friends, and has never 
been disciplined by any school authority. However, near the end of her 3rd year, she fell ill with 
the flu and fell way behind in her schoolwork. She missed three weeks of class, which resulted in 
her having to rush a report that would be worth 40% of her English grade. She was so desperate 
about the report that she went online and passed off a report she found on that subject as her own. 
Her English professor caught her and referred her to the college’s Academic Standards 
Committee.  
 
 
1. How right was Mary’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
       Very Right             Very Wrong 
2. How moral was Mary’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
         Very moral              Very immoral 
3. How responsible was Mary for her behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
      Not at all responeible            Entirely Responsible 
4. How ethical was Mary’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
     Very ethical               Very unethical 
5. How justified was Mary’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Entirely justified           Not justified at all 
6. How rational was Mary’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
      Very irrational               Very rational 
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7. To what extent did Mary have good reasons for her behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Very good reasons         No good reasons at all 
8. Do you think Mary should be held legally responsible for her actions? 
Yes No Not Sure 
9. How guilty is Mary? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
      Not guilty at all    Very guilty 
10. According to her college’s Academic Standards Committee, there are a number of 
possible punishments for plagiarism. If you had to choose from one of the following 
options to assign to Mary, which would you assign? 
_____ No punishment 
_____ Disciplinary probation 
_____ Assignment to an Academic Integrity Seminar and $75 fee 
_____ 1 semester suspension 
_____ 2 semester suspension 
_____ Expulsion from college 
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Choose the Outcome (Jim) 
 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions below IN ORDER: 
Jim works for a very corrupt company that is worth billions of dollars. Jim earns minimum wage, 
even though he has been a loyal employee for decades and deserves to earn more money. He is 
also very aware that his company is very corrupt. As a loving father, Jim wants more than 
anything for his children to be able to attend college after they graduate high school, but the 
reality is he cannot afford to. His oldest daughter has recently graduated high school as 
valedictorian of her class and has been accepted into several Ivy League schools including 
Harvard and Yale. Desperate to give his daughter the future she deserves, Jim embezzles 
$20,000 from his company.  
 
1. How right was Jim’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
       Very Right             Very Wrong 
2. How moral was Jim’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
         Very Moral             Very Immoral 
3. How responsible was Jim for his behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
      Not at all responsible             Entirely responsible 
4. How ethical was Jim’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
     Very ethical               Very Unethical 
5. How justified was Jim’s action? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Entirely justified           Not justified at all 
6. How rational was Jim’s behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
      Very rational               Very irrational 
7. To what extent did Jim have good reasons for his behavior? 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Very good reasons              No good reasons at all 
8. Do you think Jim should be held legally responsible for his actions? 
Yes No Not Sure 
9. How guilty is Jim? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
      Not guilty at all            Very guilty 
10. The scenario you were presented with occurred in Hawaii. According to Hawaii law, 
embezzlement of this sort is punishable by 1 to 10 years imprisonment. If you were on 
the jury and had to assign one of the following options to Jim, which would you assign? 
_____ No prison time 
_____ 1-2 years prison time 
_____ 3-4 years prison time 
_____ 5-6 years prison time 
_____ 7-8 years prison time 
_____ 9-10 years prison time 
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Appendix C 
Free Will and Determinism Questionnaire  
For each statement below, choose a number from 1 (Totally Disagree) to 5 (Totally Agree) to 
indicate how much you agree or disagree.  
1. I believe that the future has already been determined by fate.  ______ 
2. As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. ______ 
3. People have complete control over the decisions they make. ______ 
4. Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. ______ 
5. People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. ______ 
6. No one can predict what will happen in this world. ______ 
7. Your genes determine your future. ______ 
8. People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. ______ 
9. Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. ______ 
10. Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. ______ 
11. Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. ______ 
12. Criminals are entirely responsible for the bad things they do. ______ 
13. Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. ______ 
14. No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. ______ 
15. People are always at fault for their bad behavior. ______ 
16. Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. ______ 
17. We should avoid punishing people because many of them can’t help doing what they do. 
______ 
18.  What happens to people is a matter of chance. ______ 
